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Abstract
In recent years Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has received considerable
attention from both private investors as well as pension funds. Despite this
proliferation in interest, several topics are still unresolved, namely selection
methods, performance and e®ects regarding sustainability. This paper examines
how green investors can induce ¯rms to invest in cleaner production technology
by using exclusionary investment screens. SRI is more likely to be successful
when abatement costs are low and if principle guided investors are numerous and
have homogenous investment principles. The transformation process becomes
more probable when shares of clean ¯rms are viewed as a separate asset class
by all investors. Green investors have to accept lower returns from shares of
clean ¯rms, even in the case of positive externalities.
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Socially Responsible Investment has moved more and more into the spotlight
of private and institutional investors. According to the American industry or-
ganisation SIF (Social Investment Forum) \a total of USD 2.16 trillion in assets
was identi¯ed in the United States in professionally managed portfolios (pen-
sion funds or public SRI funds) using one or more of the three core socially
responsible investing strategies { screening, shareholder advocacy, and commu-
nity investing".1 This amounts to about 11% of all investments. Also in Europe
SRI assets have grown considerably, albeit their proportion of total assets is not
nearly as high as in the United States. The origins of SRI can be traced back
to the 19th century, when members of methodist and quaker churches thought
about the consequences of their investments. The launch of the Pax World
Fund in 1971 can be seen as the starting signal for modern SRI products.
In the last thirty years investment methods and theoretical foundations of
SRI products have developed considerably. So-called principle guided invest-
ments can make use of negative (exclusionary) and/or positive screens (e.g.
highlighting eco-e±ciency criteria for the positive choice of \sustainability-
leaders") and sometimes include also an engagement approach, in order to
in°uence management decisions.2 However, there are still open questions with
regard to current methods and procedures of SRI products; the most important
being ¯nancial and environmental performance as well as transparency.
First, evaluation of performance of SRI portfolios or indexes, which are
based upon the stakeholder model (Freeman, 1984), have delivered ambiguous
results so far. In the last twenty years there has been a steadily growing body of
literature about the topic of the appropriateness of the stakeholder versus the
shareholder model and many di®erent stakeholder concepts and models have
been proposed (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Some studies empirically test
transmission links from stakeholder management to economic pro¯ts, in order to
generate implications for management and SRI investors. But they usually face
the problems of identifying the direction of causality and of unobserved factors
(Berman et al., 1999). Some stakeholder theorists, drawing heavily on moral
or ethical guidance for corporate behaviour, emphasise the normative aspect of
stakeholder theory. This point is of course the most controversial and Friedman
already responded to it in 1970. Empirical evidence on whether recommenda-
tion of the stakeholder or of the shareholder model is a better prescription for
the successful management of companies, is still inconclusive despite many sta-
tistical studies. For literature surveys regarding empirical studies see SchrÄ oder
(2004), Orlitzky et al. (2003) or Murphy (2002).
Second, both potential investors as well as ¯rms quoted on the stock ex-
change complain that it is not at all transparent to them how SRI analysts
derive their ratings. This in turn seems to be a hindrance for further growth of
SRI (von Flotow et al., 2002). Additionally, the process of portfolio construction
is not very lucid, especially in those SRI funds which do not use exclusionary
1www.socialinvest.org/areas/reserchtrends/sri trends report2003.pdf
2The terms exclusionary and negative screens will be used as synonyms in the rest of the
text.
1screens, but also invest in so called \best-in-class" companies of every industry.
Some SRI indices built upon these methods therefore have a very low tracking
error vs. traditional indices. To pinpoint di®erences between these two groups
of indices can be very di±cult (Schepers and Sethi, 2003; SchrÄ oder, 2005). Some
SRI proponents argue that SRI is \just" a di®erent investment style.
Third, it is unclear how big the positive impact on the environment of
SRI products really is. Many investors buying SRI products intend to support
and improve sustainability. But sustainability usually is very loosely de¯ned
and the link between actual investments and the e®ect on the environment
can not be measured. Therefore, the question of how much sustainability an
investor gets by buying a certain product cannot be answered. Generally, SRI
proponents argue that ¯rms will try to become best-in-class in the eyes of green
investors. With that mechanism the whole economy would be ideally geared
toward sustainability.
This paper sheds light on the questions of performance, transparency and
sustainability (implying less pollution) under the assumptions that ¯rms aim to
maximise ¯rm value and that green (SRI) investors use exclusionary screens. It
is shown how SRI funds through the use of negative screens can, indirectly in-
duce polluting ¯rms to switch to a clean technology. Chances of success mainly
depend upon the size of abatement costs, the distribution of green and neu-
tral investors and the size of covariances between shares of clean and polluting
¯rms. Also, if shares of clean ¯rms have lower risk, a point stressed very often
by SRI proponents, the transformation to a less polluting economy becomes
more likely. Because abatement is not free of charge, the return of shares of
clean ¯rms is lower than the return of shares of polluting ¯rms and since prin-
ciple guided investors buy only shares of clean ¯rms, they have a lower return
on their portfolios for an extended investment horizon.
This paper contributes to the literature regarding the relationship between
corporate sustainability and economic performance by more closely examining
how switches to a cleaner production technology take place and by drawing con-
clusions for principle guided investors. The model presented here is a two agent
model (green and neutral investors) in a static one-period context. The agents
can invest in riskless assets or in shares of ¯rms working with clean or pollut-
ing technology. Green investors use exclusionary screens and invest in stocks
only if they are from ¯rms with clean technology. Some ¯rms with polluting
technology will switch to the state of a clean technology incurring additional
abatement costs when green investors are numerous. It can be shown, given
normal microeconomic assumptions (¯rms as shareholder-value maximising en-
tities), that the current low population of SRI investors can only be e®ective
if abatement costs are also very low. If abatement costs are substantial, then
the proportion of green investors has to be almost half of the population. And
principle guided investors must be willing to accept a reduction of achievable
returns. If these opportunity costs are too high (which they most likely are
for example in the case of pension funds, which have to ful¯ll their ¯duciary
obligations vis-a-vis their bene¯ciaries) the only open channel for change of the
green investors' community would be the political channel as Statman (2000)
already suggests. All these cases are only possibly successful, if green investors
2have homogenous beliefs with regard to the use of exclusionary screens, a con-
dition which currently is not present, since it seems that product providers at
the moment are more interested in product di®erentiation. The paper also clar-
i¯es how neutral investors indirectly in°uence the success of the outcome, both
in the case that shares of clean ¯rms form a di®erent asset class and in the
case where they do not. Additionally, the paper sheds light on the question of
which properties positive externalities have to contain in order to in°uence the
\greening process". Finally, the paper investigates implicit return expectations
of neutral and green investors.
Despite the rise of SRI, there has been amazingly little research devoted to
building theoretical models evaluating the e®ectiveness of di®erent SRI meth-
ods. Most research concentrates on empirical evaluations regarding performance
of SRI portfolios. The model presented here builds on the model of Heinkel et
al. (2001); in fact, it is a general version of what they term \the alternative
model". In their model, it is assumed that half of the ¯rms have a clean tech-
nology. Green investors can then only force some ¯rms of the other half to
reform.3 In the model presented here, ¯rms switch to a clean technology by
investing in abatement and therefore a change not only in the expected return
but also in risk characteristics is assumed, which is intuitively more plausible.
As a side e®ect an additional diversi¯cation e®ect occurs, in contrast to the
model of Heinkel et al. (2001). This additional diversi¯cation e®ect can have,
under certain conditions, a big impact on the occurrence of switches: For ex-
ample when abatement costs are relatively low and only a few green investors
are present, neutral investors will invest in shares of clean ¯rms, not because of
principle guided beliefs, but for risk reduction reasons.
Beltratti (2003) investigates SRI with a two-period, two-agent model in
a general equilibrium context, where the externality from production activity
negatively in°uences the utility of agents. His results are basically in line with
our ¯ndings that SRI will not be very e®ective in the reduction of pollution
when the number of principle guided investors is relatively small, since the
boycott by green investors using exclusionary screens will be undermined by
substitutional investments of neutral, opportunistic investors.
These insights suggest that homogeneous beliefs of SRI are central, in order
to have any positive impact on the environment. Evaluation and appraisal
of polluting ¯rms and industries should either be conducted with generally
accepted and precisely de¯ned methods, or should be undertaken by only a
few SRI rating agencies, as is the case in bond rating. This would lead to
less product di®erentiation within SRI and would result in more homogeneous
beliefs of green investors. Currently there exist some undertakings which aim
in this direction. The Global Reporting Initiative, for example, has the mission
to develop and promote globally applicable sustainability reporting guidelines.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the purpose
3Since Heinkel et al. (2001) assume that so called reformed ¯rms do not change their
characteristics with regard to original risk, they have to introduce a no-arbitrage condition
in order to impede neutral investors from making riskless arbitrage between reformed ¯rms
(which are more expensive) and still polluting ¯rms, which both have still the same risk
characteristics.
3and functions of exclusionary screens in today's SRI world are brie°y described.
Section 3 describes the model in detail. In Section 4, the equilibrium and
comparative statics are given, while Section 5 provides numerical examples.
The connection between the use of exclusionary screens and the investment
return which green investors can achieve, will be elaborated in Section 6. In
Section 7, theoretical considerations and practical implications will be given.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Exclusionary screens: Purpose and applications
Exclusionary screens are transparent because they can be checked and veri¯ed
by third parties. Application of such screens can be based upon ethical beliefs.
As an example, some investors avoid tobacco stocks or shares of the gaming
industry, which they consider to be sinful or harmful according to their per-
sonal beliefs. Negative screens can also be put in place with an ecological idea
combined with an economic rationale: These investors avoid investing in an
environmentally harmful industry for ecological reasons and with the economic
rationale of raising the cost of capital of such ¯rms. Higher capital costs will
raise relative prices of products and reduce sales. In this process, products of
boycotted industries should be substituted by goods of clean industries. Crite-
ria for the application of exclusionary screens for environmental reasons could
be chosen with regard to excessive environmental damage (resource extraction,
CO2-emissions), which are mostly caused by certain industries.
But exclusionary screens are seldom put in place. According to Statman
(2000), the Domini Social Index, an index of stocks of socially responsible com-
panies modelled on the S&P500 Index and initiated in May 1990 by Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini & Company (KLD) uses exclusionary screens only for mil-
itary weapon systems, alcohol and tobacco and gaming products or services.
Very often negative screens are chosen for the sole reason of producing portfo-
lios which are consistent with the belief of the sponsor. But exclusionary screens
also have their caveat: Firstly, conglomerates produce in many di®erent indus-
tries (and sometimes also operate partially in \sin" ¯elds) { so sustainability
analysts have to use an arbitrary cut o® point (usually a percentage limit of
revenues), in order to judge if the relevant company should be included or ex-
cluded. Secondly, if a green investor wants to use exclusionary screens in order
to avoid investments in e.g. resource extractive industries, but still invests in
industries in which products are mainly based upon that one critical resource,
the positive e®ect on the environment will not be that big, namely only as far
as capital costs for those products have increased.
The model in this paper assumes that green investors work with exclusionary
negative screens, e.g are not willing to invest in ¯rms which have a polluting
technology. Green investors therefore restrict their stock investment universe
to shares of clean companies.
43 The basic model
The model assumes a one-period world in which three categories of assets are
available: riskfree assets, shares of companies producing with a polluting tech-
nology (P) and shares of companies which work with a clean technology (C).
The total number of ¯rms F, consists of FP polluting ¯rms and FC clean ¯rms.
In the model there are I investors, namely IN neutral and IG green in-
vestors. Green investors only invest in the risk free asset and (if available) in
shares of clean companies, since they use negative screens (no investments in
shares of polluting ¯rms). Neutral investors have no principle guided invest-
ment preferences and optimise their portfolios considering both risk free assets
as well as all shares in the investment universe.
An FP ¯rm can invest in abatement and by doing this, switch to the group of
FC ¯rms. An FP ¯rm will incur transformation costs of A, if enterprise value can
be raised. Each FC ¯rm uses a clean technology and has a normally distributed
expected ¯rm value with mean ¹C and variance ¾2
C. The expected values of FC
¯rms are perfectly correlated with each other. Accordingly, each FP ¯rm uses a
polluting technology and generates a normally distributed expected value with
mean ¹P and variance ¾2
P. Also the expected values of FP ¯rms are perfectly
correlated with each other. The covariance between the expected values of FC
¯rms and FP ¯rms is ¾PC. The expected value of a ¯rm can be conceived as
the sum of the discounted cash °ows over the \lifetime" of the ¯rm. Since the
basic model is static, the factor time is not included, and therefore the label
\expected value" was chosen.
The following two equations describe the utility functions of neutral (IN)
and green (IG) investors. The utility functions consist of the expected (and
not discounted) return (expected value minus price of shares) from which the
weighted risk of the portfolio is subtracted. As usual in this literature, both
groups of investors have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with a risk
tolerance parameter ¿.















where xIF is the number of shares of ¯rms of category F 2 [P;C], held by type
I investor (I 2 [N;G]) and PF is the price of shares of category F.
Equation (1) shows that neutral investors will regard the full set of assets
in order to ¯nd their optimal portfolio. They consider investments in riskfree
assets, the rate of which is determined exogenously under the assumption of a
perfectly elastic supply, investments in ¯rms with polluting technology as well
5as potential investments in ¯rms with clean technology.
As principle guided investors, green investors will con¯ne themselves only to
investments in the risk free assets and in shares of ¯rms with clean technology,
as can be seen from equation (2). Firms with clean technology exist when some
of the ¯rms (instantaneously) invest in abatement. Equation (3) depicts the





yes, if PC > PP + A
indi®erent, if PC = PP + A
no, if PC < PP + A
(3)
where A is the cost of investment in abatement.
When no green investors exist and abatement costs are sizeable, all ¯rms
work with a polluting technology and all have therefore the same expected
value characteristics (¹P;¾P). When abatement costs are not negligible and the
number of green investors is very small, then these principle-guided investors
can only invest in the risk free asset, since no clean ¯rm exists. An increase in
the proportion of green investors raises the chances that some polluting ¯rms
implement a cleaner production technology, because the higher the proportion of
green investors, the lower will be the share prices of polluting ¯rms. If the share
price of polluting ¯rms PP is lower than the share price of clean ¯rms PC minus
abatement costs A, than some polluting ¯rms will invest in abatement until the
equilibrium is reached, as given by equation (3). By investing in abatement,
the reforming ¯rms can raise ¯rm value and will then have the expected value
characteristics of clean ¯rms (¹C;¾C). This transition is central to the model
and is possible because green and eventually also neutral investors buy shares
of ¯rms with clean technology. But the switch to a cleaner production process
(or the investment in end-of-pipe abatement) can be expensive, and shares of
¯rms which switch to a clean technology will provide a lower return than the
shares of polluting ¯rms.
4 Equilibrium and comparative statics
In order to calculate the proportion of clean and polluting ¯rms, we ¯rst com-
pute the optimal portfolio holdings of each investor group. By taking the deriva-
tives of uN with respect to xNP and xNC, we derive the ¯rst order conditions
for optimal portfolio holdings of a neutral investor
¿(¹P ¡ PP) ¡ (xNP¾2
P + xNC¾PC) = 0 (4)
¿(¹C ¡ PC) ¡ (xNC¾2
C + xNP¾PC) = 0 (5)
By employing(4) and (5), we can solve for a neutral investor's optimal port-
folio holdings of shares of ¯rms with polluting technology (x¤
NP) and of shares













P ¡ (¹P ¡ PP)¾PC] (7)




By inspecting (6) and (7), we see that the optimal holdings of shares of neu-
tral investors will increase with the risk tolerance of investors and will fall when
Á rises. Á takes a higher value, the higher the risk of shares of clean and/or
polluting ¯rms. Equation (6) shows that optimal holdings of shares of pollut-
ing ¯rms by neutral investors will be higher, the higher the expected returns of
shares of polluting ¯rms, the higher the risk (variance) of shares of clean ¯rms,
the lower the return of shares of clean ¯rms and the lower the covariation of
shares of both groups. As we can see from (7), optimal holdings of shares of
clean ¯rms by neutral investors will be higher, the higher the expected returns
of shares of clean ¯rms, the higher the risk (variance) of shares of polluting
¯rms, the lower the return of shares of polluting ¯rms and the lower the covari-
ation of shares of both groups.
Since a green investor invests only in shares of clean ¯rms, we get one ¯rst
order condition for a green investor. By taking the derivative of uG with respect
to xGC, we have
¿(¹C ¡ PC) ¡ (xGC¾2
C) = 0 (8)
and by solving for x¤
GC, we obtain a green investor's optimal portfolio hold-






[(¹C ¡ PC)] (9)
The optimal portfolio holding of shares of clean ¯rms of a green investor
will be higher, when these shares have a higher expected return and/or lower
risk. When the risk tolerance of investors is higher, they will also hold more
shares of clean ¯rms.
Since principle guided investors only buy shares of clean ¯rms, whereas




GC = FC (10)
7INx¤
NP = FP (11)
By substituting the optimal portfolio holdings [eq. (6), (7) and (9)] in the
market clearing conditions [(eq. (10) and (11)], we can solve for the equilibrium
share prices of clean ¯rms (PC) and polluting ¯rms (PP)





C + FP¾PC) (12)

















Equations (12) and (13) describe the equilibrium prices of shares of ¯rms
working with a clean or polluting technology. The share prices of each category
will be higher, the higher their respective expected values and/or the higher the
risk tolerance of investors. Equation (12) shows that the share price of a clean
¯rm is independent from the distribution of neutral or green investors, because
both investor groups will invest in shares of ¯rms with clean technology. The
price of such shares will be smaller, the more ¯rms with clean technology exist
and /or the higher their risk. When covariation of shares of clean and polluting
¯rms is high and simultaneously a big number of polluting ¯rms exist, then this
will lead to a lower price of shares of clean ¯rms. Equation (13) shows that the
share price of polluting ¯rms depends upon the distribution of neutral and green
investors. If the number of green investors is zero, then the second term in the
brackets vanishes and the third term is analogous to the ¯rst term in equation
(12), since I = IN). The second and the third term will gain in importance
with a rising number of green investors and are therefore very important for
the probability of the conversion of polluting ¯rms to clean technology. The
third term basically shows that a higher risk of shares of polluting ¯rms makes
those shares relatively less attractive for neutral investors, which leads to a
lower share price and to a faster conversion of some polluting ¯rms. The sign of
the second term depends upon the sign of the covariation of shares of clean and
polluting ¯rms. If covariation is negative, then clean shares are very valuable
for neutral investors, because they o®er excellent diversi¯cation. This e®ect
will be strengthened when the risk of clean shares is low.
Equation (3) de¯nes the equilibrium condition for the switch of polluting
¯rms to a clean technology, by imposing the condition that the price of shares
of clean ¯rms has to be equal to the price of polluting ¯rms plus the additional


























8As equation (14) shows, the number of ¯rms with clean technology (FC) will
be higher, the higher the expected value of clean ¯rms relative to the expected
value of polluting ¯rms and abatement costs, and the higher the risk tolerance
of investors. Also, the lower ¾C and ¾PC and the higher ¾P, the higher will be
the proportion of clean ¯rms. The same obviously holds true for any rise in the
number of green investors (IG).
5 Numerical Examples
After having examined the analytical results, we take a closer look at how sev-
eral exogenous variables will in°uence the outcome of the proportion of clean
and polluting ¯rms. By examining the impact of di®erent parameter constella-
tions, we can draw conclusions with regard to sensitivities. This is important
not only for green (SRI) investors, whose aim is to reduce pollution with their
principle guided investments, but also for neutral investors, who want to attain
optimal portfolios with respect to return and risk.
From inspecting equation (3) it is easy to see that the size of abatement
costs A is a parameter of central importance for the process of switching to
a clean technology. In this context it can also be shown that the magnitude
of covariation is of tremendous importance. SRI proponents often claim that
shares of sustainable investments carry less risk. According to the presented
model the switch to a clean technology is less likely, if this assumption of SRI
proponents does not hold true.
In the ¯rst subsection we introduce and discuss the baseline set of param-
eters. In this base case, green investors have to constitute about 40% of all
investors in order to induce the ¯rst polluting ¯rm to switch to a clean tech-
nology. In subsection 5.2, we will examine how di®erences in the magnitude of
abatement costs will in°uence results. Since this relationship is of primary in-
terest, it will be examined in depth. It will be shown that if abatement costs are
low, many switches to clean technology take place. In cases of higher abatement
costs, though, the population of green investors already has to be much higher
than today's, in order to induce ¯rst positive e®ects. If abatement costs are
prohibitively high, then either the population of green investors has to be the
dominating group or policy has to set stricter regulations in order to introduce
a switch to a clean production technology. In subsection 5.3 we will examine
how the \greening" of the economy proceeds if shares of clean ¯rms are viewed
as a di®erent asset class. When shares of clean ¯rms have a low covariation
with regard to shares of polluting ¯rms and/or if they have lower risk (stan-
dard deviation), they can be regarded as a di®erent asset class, which makes
them more interesting from the point of view of neutral investors. In subsection
5.4 we will examine how the occurrence of switches to a clean technology will
be a®ected if we assume positive externalities of expected values of clean ¯rms.
5.1 Baseline set of parameters
The following baseline set of parameters was chosen:
9Table 1: Baseline set of parameters
Expected value: uP = uC = 10
Standard deviation of expected values: ¾P = ¾C = 10
Covariance of expected values: ¾PC = 50
Aggregate risk tolerance of investors ¿ = 100
Abatement costs: A = 1:0 (10% of expected value)
With one exception (abatement costs A) all parameter settings were selected
in line with the model of Heinkel et al. (2001), in order to compare results. They
chose this parameter setting in order to produce what they call \reasonable
cost of capital" of ¯rms (or expected rates of return from the point of view of
investors). The resulting cost of capital of about 8% translates to an \expected
equity risk premium" of the same size, since the riskless rate is assumed to be
zero. But it has to be mentioned that this is not a \normal" risk premium,
which usually represents the extra return of stocks vs. a riskless rate per year.
In this case time does not enter the model, and the term \required return"
represents more an \expected return or pro¯t" (expected value minus share
price divided by share price). The expected values could represent the sum of
undiscounted cash °ows of the ¯rms. The \cost of capital" or \expected return"
corresponds to the amount by which the expected value (sum of undiscounted
cash °ows) surpasses stock prices. This will be further elaborated on in Section
6.
For the economic calibration of the model abatement costs are not central.
In the base case of the presented model abatement costs are set twice as high
as in Heinkel et al.(2001), for the simple reason that their model assumes that
at least half of the ¯rms work with clean technology in any case, whereas in
the presented model this restrictive assumption is not made. Calculations with
assumption of their abatement costs of 0.2, 0.5 and 2.0 will be shown in the
next subsection.










Figure 1: Ratio of clean ¯rms to all ¯rms with abatement costs of 1.0
Figure 1 shows the ratio of ¯rms with clean technology to all ¯rms with
10the assumption that abatement costs A = 1, corresponding to 10% of expected
value of ¯rms. When the number of green Investors IG is below 40% then no
polluting ¯rm switches to a clean technology. At 40% the ¯rst switch takes
place. It has to be noted that this number is much higher than the current
proportion of green investors. If the investors with green beliefs become more
populous, the ratio of clean ¯rms to all ¯rms (NC=N) monotonically increases.
When all investors are green, all the ¯rms are working with clean technology,
because no neutral investors exist buying shares of ¯rms working with polluting
technology.
5.2 Di®erent abatement costs
To show the in°uence of the size of abatement costs, we assume the following
di®erent levels:
Abatement costs: A = 0:2(2% of expected value), A = 0:5(5%), A = 2:0(20%)










Figure 2: Ratio of clean ¯rms to all ¯rms in dependence of abatement costs
The case where abatement costs A are 0.5 (5% of expected value), corre-
sponds to the base case of Heinkel et al (2001). If abatement costs are that
low, the ¯rst switch takes place already with the presence of a few green in-
vestors. When abatement costs are practically negligible (A corresponding to
only 2% of expected value), even in the absence of any green investors, more
than 30% of companies switch to clean technology, since it is in the interest of
neutral investors for risk reduction reasons. Of course neutral investors in this
case are accepting only a slight reduction of return. As soon as green investors
become more numerous, the proportion of clean ¯rms immediately and steadily
increases. When abatement costs are economically very sizeable (A correspond-
ing to 20% of expected values), than the vast majority of investors have to share
green beliefs before the ¯rst ¯rm will switch to a clean technology. If abate-
ment costs are that high, one can assume that only policy can improve the
environmental situation, by imposing stricter laws and regulations concerning
polluting production technologies. The dashed vertical line at IG = 0:8 shows
that the proportion of clean ¯rms strongly depends upon the size of abatement
costs; if abatement costs are 20% of expected value, the proportion of clean
11¯rms is only just under 40%, whereas in the other two cases it is slightly below
and above 80%.
5.3 Di®erent risk characteristics: Clean ¯rms as a di®erent as-
set class
When shares of clean ¯rms have the same risk characteristics (standard devia-
tion and perfect correlation) as shares of polluting ¯rms, neutral investors will
not buy such stocks, as they o®er lower return without a reduction of total
portfolio risk. On the other hand, as the case of low abatement costs in the
previous example showed, the switch to a clean technology can happen even
in the absence of green investors, due to the motivation of neutral investors to
optimise the risk-return relationship of their portfolios. Since the diversi¯ca-
tion motive of neutral investors has such a big impact on results, we want to
consider ¯rst the in°uence of di®erent covariances of ¯rms with clean and pol-
luting technology and afterwards examine the case of lower standard deviations
of shares of clean ¯rms.
All parameters are set as in the baseline example, except the covariance of
expected values: ¾PC = 50, ¾PC = 10, ¾PC = 90










Figure 3: Di®erent levels of covariances
Figure 3 shows how the covariance of the expected value of shares of clean
and polluting ¯rms determines the proportion of each group. When shares
of green and polluting ¯rms are highly correlated (covariance of 90), green
investors have to constitute 80% of the population in order to induce the ¯rst
¯rms to switch to a clean technology. This is, of course, due to the fact that the
expected return of shares of clean ¯rms is lower because of the abatement cost
of 10% of the original price and so o®ers little diversi¯cation (risk reduction)
bene¯ts. When covariance is markedly lower (10), then the switch happens with
a much lower population of green investors, since neutral investors will invest
in shares of clean ¯rms for diversi¯cation reasons, in order to get a better risk-
return relationship. Since the diversi¯cation motive of neutral investors can
play such a decisive role, it is worth discussing here the baseline value for ¾PC
12of 50. This value corresponds to a correlation coe±cient of about 0:7, which can
be regarded as a \normal number" for stocks belonging to di®erent industries.
A covariance of 90 is certainly very high and would mirror the co-movement of
shares of ¯rms within a homogenous industry. A covariance of 10 would depict
the (unrealistic) case where stocks of clean and polluting ¯rms would show lower
correlation than that observable between stocks and bonds in \normal times",
and would even come close to the hedge funds case (asset class unrelated to
other asset classes).
The second component to consider for calculation of total portfolio risk is
the standard deviation of shares of clean ¯rms. For any switches to occur,
shares of clean ¯rms have to exhibit lower risk (standard deviation) than their
counterparts of polluting ¯rms. The importance of this factor is demonstrated
in Figure 4. While the solid line in Figure 4 represents the base case, the
dotted line represents the situation in which ¯rms with polluting technologies
have higher risk (¾P = 12) and ¯rms with a clean technology have lower risk
(¾C = 8). In order to eliminate the (small) impact from the induced change of
correlation, covariation was slightly reduced to 48.




















Figure 4: Case where clean (polluting) ¯rms have less (more) risk
When shares of clean ¯rms have lower risk, clean ¯rms will come into ex-
istence at a much lower level compared to the base case. And afterwards the
number of clean ¯rms is consistently higher than in the base case, regardless of
how many green investors exist. This is due to the obvious fact that c.p. the
(clean) ¯rms with less risk are also more attractive for neutral investors.
SRI proponents claim that socially responsible ¯rms carry less ¯nancial risk.
This argument, that SRI ¯rms are safer (i.e. especially have less reputation
and environmental damage risks) is underpinned by event studies (Hamilton,
1995). For these cases SRI arguments have some merit and imply that through
this risk reduction e®ect a \greening" of industry could be initiated by green
investors supported by neutral investors. But SRI proponents do not argue that
SRI shares have a low correlation to a traditional stock universe and thereby
constitute a di®erent asset class. When green investors use exclusionary screens
13and abatement costs are not negligible, the process of transformation would be
considerably supported if it were possible to show that SRI is indeed a di®erent
asset class. Quite contrary to that conclusion, some SRI proponents emphasise
that SRI is \just" a di®erent investment style.
5.4 Positive externalities on expected value of clean ¯rms
Very often SRI proponents assume that earnings of SRI ¯rms could initially
be lower than those of polluting ¯rms, but will grow faster in the long term.
This can be interpreted as the existence of intertemporal positive externalities,
maybe due to learning e®ects. Such positive externalities can only work in
favour of clean ¯rms if they do not simultaneously positively a®ect polluting
¯rms.4 If we assume that such positive e®ects are not con¯ned to each single
clean ¯rm, but raise respectively the value or the knowledge pool of all clean
¯rms at the same time, we can incorporate the existence of such e®ects by
introducing a parameter ¸ which represents a degree of positive externality for
the expected value of clean ¯rms. The expected value of clean ¯rms will then
be, according to equation (15)




where ¸ has to ful¯ll to the following condition




If ¸ = 0, we have the model which was implicitly used so far. If ¸ surpasses
the upper bound, the transformation \explodes" after appearance of the ¯rst
clean ¯rm, since the positive externality dominates abatement costs. Equation
(15) can be substituted into the utility functions [equations (1) and (2)] and
then the model can be solved accordingly.
As Figure 5 shows, the curvature changes from convexity to concavity. With
the onset of the ¯rst clean ¯rm, switches happen with higher frequency. If such
positive externalities exist, the transformation to clean technology takes place
with a much higher probability at all proportions of green investors. The dashed
straight vertical line at point 0.6 shows that the proportion of clean ¯rms in
this case has doubled.
The nature of this externality is such that only ¯rms with clean technol-
ogy pro¯t from it. There are di®erent possible interpretations for this. First,
knowledge simultaneously produced when investing in abatement could be the
reason for such an externality. And that knowledge must be part of a common
4If we assume that externalities a®ect expected value of both clean as well as polluting
¯rms this obviously has no impact on the relative valuation. If we assume that externalities
a®ect expected value of clean ¯rms in just a linear way, then this equals only a change in
abatement costs A.











Figure 5: Case where shares of clean ¯rms have higher expected values due to
positive externalities: ¸ = 0 (base case) and ¸ = 0:1.
knowledge pool, only available to clean ¯rms. Or we could assume that clean
¯rms have a higher reputation in the view of green and neutral investors alike:
both investor groups are willing to assign a higher expected value to shares of
clean ¯rms and additionally that value increases slightly the more clean ¯rms
exist. In this regard it is important to note that expected value is synonymous
with future value. And this future value depends upon two factors: (i) earn-
ings or cash °ow development (not further addressed in this paper) and (ii)
the interest rate used for discounting, incorporating appraisal of risk and time
preference of consumption. This will be discussed now in the following section.
6 Expected and required return, time horizon and
risk tolerance of investors
As already emphasised, the expected (and not discounted) return in the utility
functions of neutral and green investors does not correspond to a normal equity
risk premium. But it is possible to compute indirectly such a premium, which
gives the return per annum, if we assume that investors use a ¯nite time horizon
in their calculations. Investors calculate the expected and required future value
of their investment (uF), according to the following formula:
uF ¡ PF = (1 + gi)n ¡ 1 (17)
where PF is the current stock price of ¯rm F, gi the implied and required
growth rate and n the investors' time horizon in years. The term uF ¡ PF
corresponds to the cost of capital or required rate of return in the terminology
of the article of Heinkel et al. (2001).
If we take the calibration value for \cost of capital" of 8% of Heinkel et al.
(2001) and assume that investors discount future cash °ows over the next 10
years (n = 10), than this 8% translates to an implicit risk premium of about
150.77% p.a (=gi) a value which is too low in light of historical experience. A risk
premium of 3.75% of equity returns surpassing the return of a risk free asset
(which in this case could be a 10-year government bond) is better suited for
calibration and is in line with historical evidence. If we assume that neutral
investors demand a risk premium of 3.75%, then in 10 years the expected value
of shares has to be (1 + 0:0375)10 t 1.445 higher than the current share price
(abstracting from the appreciation of the bond in the following). But this
implies also that the parameter ¿ for the risk tolerance has to be changed.
Since the expected value has to surpass the share price not only by 8% but
by about 45%, this is only possible if ¿, the measure for risk tolerance of all
investors, is much smaller. This reduced risk tolerance leads to the e®ect that
stock prices PP and PC are both much lower. In the case that the expected
share price (expected value) in 10 years has to surpass the price investors are
willing to pay today by about 45% this translates into a sensible value of ¿ of
25. The calibration values of ¿ of 25 and the assumption that investors discount
¯rm values of 10 years are closely intertwined: the longer the discount function,
the lower the ¿ has to be in this model, where time is not directly included.
But the line of reasoning always stays the same.
The aim of this section is to elaborate on di®erences in the required returns
which neutral and green investors expect, i.e. to quantify the implicit costs of
application of exclusionary screens by green investors. One remark should be
made at this point though: green investors have the same risk aversion ¿ as
neutral investors, but since they do not want to invest in shares of polluting
¯rms at all, they are holding portfolios consisting only of stocks of clean ¯rms,
thereby foregoing higher possible investment returns at the same risk level. In
fact, green investors use a lexicographical procedure (Dupr¶ e et.al., 2004), and
through the use of this investment principle, they raise return possibilities for
neutral investors in all the cases.
In the following, we assume that risk tolerance ¿ takes a value of 25. This
corresponds to an equity premium of about 3.75% of the stock market vs. re-
turn of risk free assets per annum. One has to take into account that with such
parameter values abatement costs are relatively less important and switches
occur even with a lower population of green investors. For example with pa-
rameters of the base case of subsection 5.1 (except the change to a lower ¿)
switches already occur when green investors are less than 1%.
As a starting point, we assume that abatement costs are zero(A = 0). In this
case ¯rms can somehow switch from polluting to clean technology at no charge
and green investors can somehow perceive this even in the absence of abatement
activities. As can be seen in Figure 6 (line with A = 0), when no green investors
(IG) are present, the required return (synonymous to capital costs from the view
of ¯rms) for shares of polluting ¯rms is lowest, amounting to a 10 year equity
risk premium of about 3.7% per annum. Since green investors refrain from
purchases of shares of polluting ¯rms, the required returns of polluting ¯rms
are higher, the higher is the proportion of green investors. When all investors
are principle guided, the required return of the last polluting ¯rm has risen to
more than 5% p.a. This rise is entirely due to the fact that green investors
hold undiversi¯ed portfolios and since they have the same risk tolerance as
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Figure 6: Required return per annum of polluting ¯rms when abatement costs
are 0% resp. 10% of expected value
neutral investors, shares have to o®er a higher return (which implies a lower
share price), in order to be placed in the portfolios.
The (A = 1) line describes the case when abatement costs amount to 10% of
expected value. Here the return which neutral investors can expect from shares
of polluting ¯rms is higher for any level of green investors. The return of the
last polluting ¯rm will surpass even 7% p.a., more than 2.5% higher than in
the absence of any green investors. When green investors constitute 60% of the
whole population, a rise of abatement costs from 0 to 1 leads to an increase in
the return of shares of polluting ¯rms from about 4.5% p.a. to about 5.7% , as
can be seen by the dashed line. Neutral investors can therefore reap a positive
externality in the form of higher returns of polluting ¯rms, since green investors
shun this type of stock.
Figure 7 presents returns of shares of clean ¯rms dependent on the number
of green investors and again for two di®erent levels of abatement costs. When
abatement costs are zero, the return of shares of clean ¯rms is logically exactly
the same as the share return of ¯rms with polluting technology. If abatement
costs are 10% of expected value, share returns of clean ¯rms are lower. Shares
of the ¯rst clean ¯rms o®er a return of less than 3%. The higher the proportion
of green investors, the less the return di®erence will be in comparison to the
situation where abatement costs are zero. When green investors constitute 60%
of all investors, the return di®erence is reduced to about 0.5%.
How is the required return of clean ¯rms a®ected in a situation where ex-
ternalities positively in°uence the expected values of the shares of clean ¯rms?
When green investors are less than 40% of the total population, the required
return is slightly higher in the case where ¸ equals 0:1 compared to the case
of no positive externalities, as Figure 8 shows. But it has to be remembered
from Figure 5, that the ¯rst clean ¯rm only appears when green investors con-
stitute more than 40% of the population, so the required return is still not high
enough to overcome the risk deduction of equation (2) and therefore is still
hypothetical, because no realisation of an investment in abatement takes place.
And when green investors surpass the 40% threshold level, the greening of the
industry happens at about double the speed, due to these positive externalities.







H ΜC €€€€€€ €
PC
L
1 €€€€€€ 10 -1
A=1 A=0
Figure 7: Required return per annum of clean ¯rms when abatement costs are
0% or 10% of expected value
Not only green, but also the \free riding" neutral investors acquire shares of
clean ¯rms with higher probability. In the end the expected return of shares of
clean ¯rms rises more slowly than in the case of the absence of externalities. As
we saw in subsection 5.4 the existence of positive externalities leads to \faster"
greening, since neutral investors aim to pro¯t from higher expected values of
shares of clean ¯rms. This e®ect on total demand even reduces expected return
when green investors are the majority.
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Figure 8: Required return of clean ¯rms when abatement costs are 10% of
expected value and in the presence of positive externalities ¸ = 0:1
When abatement costs are 10% of expected value, the return of shares of
clean ¯rms is about 1% to 2% lower per year than the return of shares of pollut-
ing ¯rms. This return disadvantage of green investors versus neutral investors
seems to be not that big, but the wealth of neutral investors will grow much
more strongly than the wealth of green investors due to the compounding e®ect.
It has to be mentioned that abatement takes place only once at the beginning
of the 10 year time period. Several rounds of introducing cleaner technology
would lower return possibilities more. Since neutral investors optimise their
portfolios only with regard to return and risk, they can pro¯t from the appear-
ance of green investors, who shun shares of ¯rms with polluting technology.
18Required return for such ¯rms will rise, whereas the required return for shares
of clean ¯rms will be lower. Neutral investors therefore pro¯t indirectly from
strategies of principle guided investors. This holds true also for the case of
positive externalities on the expected value of clean ¯rms.
7 Implications for SRI
The presented model operates with a clear di®erentiation between ¯rms re-
garding technology: clean (FC) or polluting (FP) ¯rms di®er only because of
abatement (A). One could argue that neither of these terms is de¯ned precisely.
In theory, FC and FP could alternatively stand for a totally di®erent dimension,
e.g. socially acceptable behaviour in which case A would be an investment in a
societal cause. In the case of focussing on either dimension (environmental or
social), A could also be just a marketing activity to give the impression that
the ¯rm belongs to the class of companies which would be bought by principle
guided investors. But such window-dressing would only show e®ects if no ob-
jectively veri¯able variable is available which can be traced by outsiders. And
the aforementioned argument can also be countered by the consideration that
the crucial point of view from economics is the question of whether FC or FP
¯rms di®er with respect to expected return and risk.
An implication of the model results is that principle guided investors can
only have an impact if their number surpasses a (variable) threshold level, which
is mainly determined by the size of the abatement costs. And this result holds
only if, additionally, the condition is ful¯lled that green investors hold homoge-
nous beliefs about what di®erentiates clean from polluting ¯rms. Therefore
we conclude that for the organisation of sustainability research, only a clearly
de¯ned, objectively measurable dimension for the di®erentiation between clean
and polluting ¯rms should be used. This derives from the implicit assumption
of the model that all green investors have unilaterally agreed about which ¯rms
are clean or polluting, e.g. have homogeneous beliefs and observations. If they
have heterogeneous beliefs about which companies are clean or polluting, the
e®ectiveness of principle-guided investments will be weakened. In this situation
green investors could agree on a few standard-setting agencies (sustainability
rating agency analogous to bond rating agencies), in order to form homogeneous
beliefs or could agree on well-accepted methods of evaluating ¯rms concerning
their environmental impact.
This aforementioned abstractness of the model has the advantage of °exi-
bility: The results of the model can be applied to the stock market as a whole,
or to any subsegment of it, as, for example, on the industry level. If the ex-
clusionary screen is used in an intra-industry sense, green investors could focus
on the most important dimensions (e.g. reduction of CO2-emission, reduction
of energy input, etc.). This would not only reduce monitoring costs immensely,
but would also have the bene¯t that the knowledge of SRI analysts could be
used to the fullest extent with regard to de¯ning the most important negative
externalities of industries and identifying better existing technologies. In cer-
tain cases, environmentally better and economically feasible technology is not
19put in place for reasons of short term cash °ow optimisation, as for example in
the steel industry in the nineteen seventies (HÄ artel, 1987).
In the case of almost negligible abatement costs, investment returns to green
investors are not that much less than investment returns to neutral investors.
In such cases, methodologies and current procedures of SRI funds can be ap-
propriate. If the number of green investors is limited, only very few ¯rms will
work with clean technology and additionally green investors will have a notice-
able return disadvantage. In this situation a collective mutual action of SRI
investors, which is focused on just one or few companies in a highly polluting
industry, could be undertaken and/or SRI proponents could additionally focus
on political action concerning changes of laws, regulations and introduction of
taxes on negative externalities (Statman, 2000).
8 Summary and conclusions
SRI proponents argue under the basic tenets of stakeholder theory that ¯rms
aiming at achieving economic, social and environmental goals simultaneously
should have a better economic performance than ¯rms which just focus on
corporate pro¯ts. Neoclassical proponents of shareholder value proclaim, on
the other hand, that management should only maximise ¯rm pro¯ts. Empirical
results of SRI versus traditional portfolios are still ambiguous so far. SRI's line
of argumentation on how corporate sustainability should simultaneously lead
to better environmental and economic performance is on the one hand vague,
while on the other hand a ¯rm in microeconomics is basically \a black box".
The presented 2-agents, 1-period model shows, that mainly the size of abate-
ment costs and the number of green investors determine if some ¯rms switch
to a clean production technology or not. When shares of clean ¯rms form a
clearly distinguishable asset class (not only with regard to return but also with
respect to standard deviation and covariation), the positive e®ect on environ-
mental quality will be higher, because neutral investors will then also invest
meaningfully in such shares of clean ¯rms. In any case, the model unequivo-
cally predicts that principle guided investors incur opportunity costs by having
portfolios which consist only of shares of clean ¯rms, which deliver less return.
Under the assumption that avoidance of pollution incurs abatement costs,
the presented model shows that the proportion of ¯rms working with a clean
technology highly depends upon the distribution of green and neutral investors.
The model also implies that green investors have to forego some investment
returns when implementing principle guided investment strategies. Assuming
even relatively low abatement costs, the population of green investors has to be
sizeable, in order to induce some polluting ¯rms to switch to a clean technology.
The model implies that green investors using exclusionary screens will be more
successful, the lower the covariation of shares of clean and polluting ¯rms,
the lower the risk tolerance of neutral investors and the less risky (standard
deviation) shares of clean ¯rms are, and the more homogeneous the beliefs of
principle guided investors are.
SRI proponents often claim that shares of clean ¯rms carry less risk and
20event studies provide some empirical support for this argument. Implementing
these ¯ndings in the assumptions of our model leads to a higher proportion
of clean ¯rms, since neutral investors can ¯nd shares of clean ¯rms attractive
for reduction of risks despite their lower return. If investment in abatement
produces a positive externality on expected values of clean ¯rms, than this will
result in a higher proportion of clean ¯rms as soon as the ¯rst switch has oc-
curred. It could be better reputation or deepened knowledge about production
possibilities which could be responsible for the existence of this positive exter-
nality. But the economic rewards of these positive externalities will have to be
shared between green and neutral investors.
The accurate description of the nature and e®ectiveness of such positive
externalities is still open for further research. In a dynamic context, the fact
that the wealth of green investors will grow at a slower pace than that of
neutral investors could bring additional fruitful insights on if and how Socially
Responsible Investment can be successful.
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